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Uncertainty of Outcome or Star Quality? Television
Audience Demand for English Premier League
Football
BABATUNDE BURAIMO and ROB SIMMONS
ABSTRACT This paper presents new evidence on the relevance of uncertainty of
outcome for demand for sports viewing. Using television viewing figures for eight
seasons from the English Premier League, we show that uncertainty of outcome does
not have the hypothesised effect on television audience demand. Separating uncertainty
of outcome effects by season, the results show that, at best, uncertainty of outcome had
imprecise effects on audiences in earlier seasons, but zero effects in later seasons.
Television audiences have evolved to exhibit preferences for talent. We suggest that the
notion of a pure sporting contest in which uncertainty of outcome matters is no longer
relevant and more important is the extent to which sports teams and leagues can
increase the quality of the talent on show.
Key Words: Broadcasting; Demand; Uncertainty of Outcome; Soccer; Football;
Superstars.
JEL classifications: L82, L83.
1. Introduction
Economic analyses of professional team sports have generally been different to
those of other markets. Unlike conventional markets in which competition is
encouraged, economic cooperation is often regarded as a necessary condition
in order to maximise consumer welfare. Neale’s (1964) seminal contribution
appraised the peculiar economics of professional sport. Neale noted, among
other things, that monopoly practices were undesirable and there was a need
to maintain uncertainty of sporting outcomes. For professional sport to thrive,
the presence of viable competitors is desirable so that the unpredictability of
sporting outcomes is maximised. Essentially, the values of sporting contests
are maximised if rivals are evenly matched, as this creates uncertainty of
outcome.
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Attempts to maximise uncertainty of outcome in professional sports have
seen the introduction of policies aimed at equalising the playing strengths of
teams organised in leagues. In North American sports, the use of player drafts,
salary caps, luxury taxes, and revenue sharing are aimed at maintaining
competitive balance. In Europe, and more specifically European soccer, similar
schemes are not as prevalent, partly due to the overriding principle of free
movement of labour. Players are traded freely, although with some constraints
relating to work permits for non-EU players. Consequently, talent generally
migrates to big-budget teams where salaries are likely to be at their highest.
The only practice that might have an impact on equalising playing strength is
the distribution of broadcast revenue, but policies on this vary across leagues.
For example, since the start of the English Premier League in 1992, broadcast
revenues have been systematically shared between its member clubs, whereas
clubs negotiate broadcast rights on an individual basis in Spain. Irrespective of
whether policies to maintain some form of equality between teams actually
achieve the desired outcome, league authorities have often defended these
policies on the grounds of preserving uncertainty of outcome. However, an
important consideration for policymakers is whether preserving uncertainty of
outcome is actually welfare maximising.
The relevance of uncertainty of outcome needs to be reassessed in the era
of modern professional sports. As a theoretical conjecture that was first put
forward in the 1950s (Rottenberg 1956), it has strong merits; the validity of any
sporting contest surely depends on the comparative strengths of rivals
involved and whether outcomes are predetermined. However, there is a need
for such a conjecture to be empirically validated, particularly if it is going to
be the basis of policymaking and management practice. This is even more
relevant, as there have been numerous changes occurring in professional
sports. Specifically, in the past, the audiences for professional team sports have
predominantly been stadium goers, and they have been the dominant source
of revenue for leagues and teams. More recently, however, globalisation and
advances in technology have attracted new consumers, and broadcasting is
now a more dominant source of revenue. Many of the world’s leading sports’
leagues now generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of rights to
broadcasters who in turn broadcast matches across different platforms and
territories (Cave and Crandall 2001; Solberg 2007). According to Deloitte data,
in the 2010–11 season, revenue from broadcasting accounted for 52% of total
revenue in the English Premier League, 45% in Spain’s Primera Liga, and 60%
in Italy’s Serie A. Given the growing importance of broadcasting and television
audiences compared with the traditional markets of stadium goers, the
consideration of uncertainty of outcome should not be limited to consumers
who attend sporting contests live at stadia. Television audiences and their
preferences for outcome uncertainty should be given greater prominence in
empirical analysis. Unfortunately, the data needed for this task tend to be
elusive.
This paper examines the economic importance of uncertainty of outcome
among television audiences in the English Premier League. The results show
that the overall impact of uncertainty of outcome on television audiences is not
significantly different from 0. Separating the impact of uncertainty of outcome
across different seasons is revealing. The impact of uncertainty of outcome on
television audiences in earlier seasons is significant but only at the 10% level.
2 B. Buraimo and R. Simmons
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As the seasons progress from earlier to more recent ones, the impacts of
outcome uncertainty fall to 0. Rather than valuing contests in which outcomes
are uncertain, television audiences now have a preference for matches in
which the quality of talent (proxied here by the clubs’ wage bills) is high. The
change in preference from uncertainty of outcome to quality of playing talent
captures a fundamental shift. “Pure” sporting contests are no longer of value
and have been superseded by entertainment to be delivered by sports
superstars.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on the relationship between outcome uncertainty and attendance
demand in sports. Section 3 presents the setting, while Section 4 sets out our
data set and empirical models. The results are discussed in Section 5, and the
final section offers concluding remarks.
2. Literature on Uncertainty of Outcome
The extent to which uncertainty of outcome positively impacts consumer
demand and maximises consumer welfare is far from unambiguous
(Szymanski 2003). However, the need to preserve it has been defended by
league authorities, and the English Premier League is no exception (Restrictive
Practices Court 1999). Many studies have investigated the relationship between
uncertainty of outcome and demand across a variety of leagues and sports. For
the most part, these have concentrated on demand for stadium attendance.
Uncertainty of outcome can be viewed at three levels: match level, seasonal
dimension, and long run (Borland and Macdonald 2003; Dobson and Goddard
2011; Szymanski 2003). The focus of this paper is uncertainty of outcome at the
match level.
In baseball, Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert (1992) examine the effects of
uncertainty of outcome on game-day attendance. Using the probability of a
home win as their measure of uncertainty of outcome and controlling for a
series of factors, they find in favour of the hypothesis that as the home team’s
(or the away team’s) probability of winning became more (less) certain,
attendances declined. Attendances were maximised when the home team’s win
probability was 0.6, indicating that stadium goers have a preference for a
home win but not dominance. Lee and Fort (2008) and Mills and Fort (2014)
similarly examine uncertainty of outcome and attendance in baseball across a
long period, from 1901. However, they do not find in favour of uncertainty of
outcome effects at the game level. They do find some evidence in favour of
play-off uncertainty. Coates, Frick, and Jewell (forthcoming) also study
baseball attendance demand, but their results support ‘loss aversion’ and
directly contradict the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. They note that out
of 24 attendance demand studies surveyed, only four gave support for the
outcome uncertainty hypothesis. Analyses of uncertainty of outcome in other
sports include international cricket (Sacheti, Gregory-Smith, and Paton 2014),
rugby (Owen and Weatherston 2004a; 2004b), NBA basketball (Rascher and
Solmes 2007), college football (Paul, Humphreys, and Weinbach 2012),
American football (Paul, Wachsman, and Weinbach 2011), and soccer
(Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons 2007; Buraimo and Simmons 2008; Czarnitzki
and Stadtmann 2002; Pawlowski 2013).
Uncertainty of Outcome or Star Quality? 3
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There have been a limited number of studies that have modelled television
audience demand and even fewer modelling the effects of uncertainty of
outcome on television demand. Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005) were
among the first to examine the effects of uncertainty of outcome among
television audiences and found that uncertainty of outcome did have the
theorised impact on audience demand. Buraimo and Simmons (2009) analysed
demand for both gate attendance and television audiences in Spanish league
soccer and found that stadium goers disliked uncertainty of outcome.
However, television audiences had a preference for it. Tainsky and McEvoy
(2012) also examined the effects of uncertainty of outcome on the size of
television audiences in the NFL and found that greater uncertainty resulted in
greater audience demand in line with the hypothesis. Alavy, Gaskell, and
Szymanski (2010) used minute-by-minute measures of television audience
demand in English league football and found in favour of uncertainty of
outcome. However, the progression of the match and the score line were
dominant factors in determining the level of television audiences.
Another strand of literature examines the effects of star quality or brands
on audience demand. Studies finding some effects of star quality include Berri,
Schmidt, and Brook (2004) on National Basketball Association, and Brandes,
Franck, and Nu¨esch (2008), Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002), and Pawlowski
and Anders (2012) all on German Bundesliga. These studies all relate to gate
attendance and revenues, and do not consider the effects of star quality on
broadcast audiences, which is our concern in this paper. Previous analyses of
outcome uncertainty have relied on stadium attendance demand models,
partly because television audience data are typically difficult and expensive to
obtain. Using a rare television ratings data set from the 2000–01 to 2007–08
seasons, we examine the impact of uncertainty of outcome on the size of
television audiences.
3. The Setting
The setting for this study is the English Premier League. The English Premier
League was established in 1992 and currently comprises 20 teams. The
establishment of the Premier League coincided with advances in technology
which brought about satellite broadcasting and the entry of pay-television
operators. Their emergence saw a dramatic increase in broadcast revenue
accruing to the top tier of English football. Table 1 shows the rights values to
the English Premier League since it started. The increases in broadcast
revenues have made it the most valued soccer league in Europe.
The connection between broadcasting (increase in rights values, revenue
sharing among clubs, and number of televised games) and the clubs’
motivation to spend large sums in the labour market is an important one (Cox
2012). The desire to maximise wins means that clubs are motivated to increase
their spending in the labour market (see Table 2). The effect of an increase in
wage-bill spending by clubs in the league is substantial. The migration of
star-player talent to the English Premier League makes it a very attractive
spectacle to viewers. Broadcasters are willing to invest in this league so as to
maximise television audiences, advertising revenues, and subscriptions which
in turn helps maximise their profits.
4 B. Buraimo and R. Simmons
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Up until 2003–04, BSkyB, the principal broadcaster, had a monopoly over
Premier League broadcasts, and the number of games was limited to 66 per
season. Consequently, consumer demand was restricted to a limited number of
games. However, the European Commission was unhappy with both the
market structure and the limited outputs (Harbord and Szymanski 2004). In an
effort to keep the Commission and other competition authorities at bay, the
league increased the rights package to four packages with a total of 138
games.1 The intention of this restructuring was to allow smaller broadcasters
to enter the market. Although more and smaller rights packages were
available, BSkyB still acquired the rights to all four packages. BSkyB’s
monopoly continued, but consumers now had a greater number of matches to
view (88 matches per season). Whilst the net effect was a reduction in the
mean television audience rating, the total audience across all matches
increased by 176,000 viewers. This suggests that the previous monopoly
arrangements adversely affected consumer welfare. For the 2007–08 season, the
European Commission ruled that no single broadcaster should acquire all live
rights. It was only then that smaller broadcasters entered the market. Setanta
was the first and while its involvement in the market was short-lived (Buraimo
2012), the subsequent entries of ESPN and, most recently, British Telecom (BT)
represented competition in a market that had been monopolised by BSkyB for
15 years. The broadcast rights for the period 2013–14 to 2015–16 generated
£3.04 billion for the English Premier League (Hughson 2013). It is this increase
in economic significance in the broadcast market for sport which warrants an
empirical analysis of the effects of uncertainty of outcome and superstars on
television audience demand.
4. Data and Model
Audience data from the 2000–01 to 2007–08 seasons inclusive were obtained
from the print versions of the publication TV Sports Markets. The data are
limited to these seasons, and whilst extending the data would be desirable,
this is not feasible, since the print version of the publication ceased after 2008.
While the source of data is TV Sports Markets, the origin is the British
Audience Research Board (BARB), a not-for-profit limited company funded by
the major broadcasters in the UK and the Institute of Practitioners in
Table 1. Rights fees for English Premier League from 1992–93 to 2013–14
(Baimbridge, Cameron, and Dawson 1996; Buraimo 2012)
Year
Duration of
Contract (years) Broadcasters
Matches per
Season
Mean Annual
Rights Fee (£m)
Rights Fee per
Match (£m)
1992 5 BSkyB 60 52 0.87
1997 4 BSkyB 60 199 3.32
2001 3 BSkyB 66 371 5.62
2004 3 BSkyB 88 341 3.88
2007 3 BSkyB and Setanta* 92 and 46 567 4.11
2010 3 BSkyB and ESPN 115 and 23 594 4.30
2013 3 BSkyB and BT 116 and 38 1,012 6.58
*Setanta’s administration saw its final season’s rights bought by ESPN.
Uncertainty of Outcome or Star Quality? 5
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Advertising. BARB is the official source for television audience viewing figures
in the UK. Audience sizes derive from more than 30,000 electronic viewing
devices in a sample of more than 5,100 households (http://www.barb.co.uk).
These devices measure the number of people watching a programme when
first transmitted and also when viewed on playback. The data on viewers are
captured on a minute-by-minute basis and then averaged across the duration
of the programme to generate audience ratings.2 Unlike the Nielsen Ratings
used in the United States which measure the share of the population in
designated market areas, the UK audience ratings are the estimated number of
individuals watching the programme. Using multistaged, stratified, and
unclustered surveys, the viewing figures are then extrapolated for the whole of
the UK population (http://www.barb.co.uk).
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the television audience ratings
across the sample period. From the summary data, there was a steady increase
in the mean television audience rating from 2000–01 to 2003–04. Since this
peak, per-match audience ratings have declined. The decline coincides with the
structural change in broadcasting regime.
Over the 2000–01 to 2007–08 seasons, a total of 660 out of 3,040 games were
televised. The effective sample of the audience data set comprises 631 televised
games. A small number of observations (29 televised games) were dropped
due to missing data. The mean television audience rating was 978,647.3 Note
that the viewing ratings relate to domestic households only and do not include
pubs and social clubs where games might be shown.
The television audience rating for a match involving teams i and j in season
t is modelled as follows:
ln AUDIENCEijt
  ¼ aXijt þ bZþ ijt (1)
where Xijt is a vector of independent variables and Z is a vector of team,
month, and season fixed effects, and ijt is the disturbance term. A peculiar
feature of the market for televised English Premier League games is that not
all games are televised, as the broadcasters have some degree of freedom over
match selection. If games were modelled using ordinary least squares (OLS),
the estimates may be biased if there are differences in the characteristics of
Table 2. English Premier League wage bill and relative wages by season
Season
Wage (in millions of £) Relative Wage (mean = 1)
Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
2001–02 35.02 14.87 18.22 62.22 0.426 0.512 1.944
2002–03 36.78 15.11 11.37 70.46 0.424 0.303 2.090
2003–04 39.38 22.84 19.28 115.57 0.584 0.475 2.829
2004–05 38.47 22.28 16.92 108.89 0.573 0.419 2.695
2005–06 43.27 26.79 17.35 114.00 0.598 0.383 2.516
2006–07 47.36 28.81 17.10 132.82 0.591 0.366 2.754
2007–08 59.28 36.70 26.11 171.62 0.652 0.376 2.974
2008–09 65.59 36.35 29.75 165.61 0.537 0.448 2.518
2009–10 69.96 42.57 22.37 172.55 0.608 0.319 2.479
6 B. Buraimo and R. Simmons
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televised and non-televised games. Consequently, there might be a need to
model not just television audience demand but also the broadcasters’ choice of
games to televise.
The Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979) can be used to model
equation (1) as part of an estimation procedure which first uses maximum
likelihood estimation to model the likelihood of a game being selected for
broadcasting and, conditional on being broadcast, the size of the television
audiences. The following equation models selection:
Prob TELEVISEDijt
  ¼ UðcYijt þ kZþ eijtÞ (2)
where TELEVISEDijt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the
game between team i and team j was televised in season t and 0 otherwise, Yijt
is a vector of independent variables which include Xijt, and Uð:Þ is the
standard normal distribution function. The error term eijt has a mean value of
0 and is normally distributed with a variance of 1. If there are characteristics
that distinguish televised from non-televised games and these features
influence the broadcasters’ selection, then the correlation coefficient q, between
ijt and eijt will be statistically different from 0, and therefore the estimates in
the television audience equation derived using OLS will be biased and the
Heckman selection model offers more reliable estimates. The Heckman
selection model is an appropriate estimation procedure for establishing if there
are factors that affect whether games are televised but not the size of the
audience if televised. The existence of such factors is required for identification.
In this respect, equation (2) is the first part of the Heckman selection model,
and equation (1) is the second part. If q ¼ 0, then the estimates from Heckman
will be similar to those of OLS. Below, we report both Heckman and OLS
estimates of television audience demand.
In studies of gate attendance demand, it is normal to treat the teams
involved in the contest as home and away. However, the concepts of home
and away teams in the televised market are irrelevant, as there is no difference
in the cost of watching the games for home, away, and neutral fans. Any
group of fans could dominate the others in the televised market, unlike
Table 3. Television audience ratings for English Premier League (in millions)
N Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
By season
2000–01 60 1.09 0.35 0.20 1.94
2001–02 66 1.17 0.44 0.40 2.29
2002–03 66 1.36 0.52 0.27 3.44
2003–04 66 1.36 0.48 0.57 2.69
2004–05 88 1.22 0.56 0.41 3.14
2005–06 88 1.21 0.54 0.39 3.02
2006–07 88 1.18 0.55 0.22 2.95
2007–08 137 0.98 0.57 0.20 2.78
By broadcaster
Setanta 46 0.45 0.16 0.20 0.77
BSkyB 613 1.23 0.51 0.20 3.44
Uncertainty of Outcome or Star Quality? 7
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Table 4a. Description of summary statistics
Variable Description
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE A team’s relative wage is its wage bill for a give season
divided by the mean wage bill for that season. COMBINED
RELATIVE WAGE is the sum of the two teams’ relative
wages.
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN
RELATIVE WAGE
This the absolute difference in the two teams’ relative wage
bill.
COMBINED LAG POINTS PER
GAME
This is the combined points per game from the previous
season of the teams involved in the match.
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN LAG
POINTS PER GAME
This is the absolute difference in points per game from the
previous season of the teams involved in the match.
COMBINED POINTS PER GAME This is the sum of both teams’ points per game prior to the
match. Points per game is the ratio of the total number of
points to the number of games played prior to the match.
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN
POINTS PER GAME
This is the absolute difference in the teams’ points per game
prior to the match. Points per game is the ratio of the total
number of points to the number of games played prior to the
match.
CHAMPION CONTENTION This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if either of
the teams in the match can win the championship if it were to
win all its remaining games while others only take an average
of one point from their remaining games and 0 otherwise.
EUROPE CONTENTION This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if either of
the teams in the match can qualify for either the Champions
League or the Europa Cup but not win the championship if it
were to win all its remaining games while others only take an
average of one point from their remaining games and 0
otherwise.
RELEGATION CONTENTION This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if either of
the teams in the match can be relegated if it were to win all
its remaining games while others only take an average of one
point from their remaining games and 0 otherwise.
SETANTA This dummy variable is 1 if the match was televised by the
broadcaster Setanta and 0 otherwise. If 0, the match was
televised by BSkyB.
OTHER MATCHES This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there are
other matches being broadcast at the same time and 0
otherwise.
DERBY This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
match involves teams who are historical or local rivals and 0
otherwise.
WEEKDAY This is a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the game
is televised on Monday to Friday inclusive and 0 otherwise.
FIRST HALF This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
match is played between August and December inclusive and
0 otherwise.
SECOND HALF This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
match is played between January and May inclusive and 0
otherwise.
OUTCOME UNCERTANTY This is the absolute difference in home-win probability and
away-win probability. Probabilities are derived from the
bookmaker’s odds and adjusted for over-round.
THEIL
P3
i¼1 Pi  ln 1pi
 
where Pi is the probability of outcome i
which is any one of the three possible results.
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stadium attendance in which the home team’s fans are always dominant.
Instead of home and away, two alternative metrics are used: COMBINED and
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE (see Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo 2005).
The first of the independent variables in Xijt is COMBINED RELATIVE
WAGE. Relative wage is a team’s wage bill for the current season divided by
the mean wage bill for that season. For the eight seasons from 2001–02 to
2009–10, the mean wage bill of the English Premier League clubs increased
from £35 million to £70 million (Table 2). A typical strategy for many clubs is
to improve their playing talent by spending more on better players and
inflationary wage-bill increases. Furthermore, the variance in player talent is
also increasing. For example, the standard deviation of wage bill has generally
increased over the eight seasons shown in Table 2. The use of a relative wage-
bill measure normalises the wage bill by the average in a given season. Hence,
the mean value of the relative wage bill must be 1. The standard deviation
varies from 0.42 to 0.65, rising over time with the most recent value being 0.61.
Hence, the distribution of talent is widening as large clubs outspend others.
Wage-bill data are gathered from various years of Deloitte’s Annual Review
of Football Finance. The wage-bill data are for all the clubs’ employees and not
just the team. However, it is extremely likely that the wages of the players
dominate those of other employees in the clubs, and it is therefore a good
proxy for the quality of both the squad and the team. Furthermore, the market
mechanism for buying and selling players, which is effectively an auction,
means that the best players are also the highest paid. A test of this is the
correlation between end-of-season performance and wage bill by season. The
correlation between performance and wage bill by season is very strong (Hall,
Szymanski, and Zimbalist 2002).4 Hence, the wage bill is a good reflection of
skill and quality of talent. As COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE is the sum of the
two teams’ relative wage and as it increases, it is expected that audience rating
will also increase as fans have a preference for watching the best talent.
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE is included to capture the
spread of talent across the two teams in the match. With respect to talent, if
Table 4b. Summary statistics for televised games
Variables
Televised games (N = 631)
Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
TELEVISION AUDIENCE RATING 978,647 570,092 204,000 2,780,000
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE 2.368 0.879 0.831 5.067
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE 0.646 0.559 0.000 2.598
COMBINED POINTS PER GAME 3.104 0.815 0 6
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN POINTS PER GAME 0.658 0.525 0 3
CHAMPION CONTENTION 0.187 0.390 0 1
EUROPE CONTENTION 0.160 0.367 0 1
RELEGATION CONTENTION 0.179 0.384 0 1
SETANTA 0.071 0.258 0 1
OTHER MATCHES 0.025 0.194 0 2
DERBY 0.074 0.263 0 1
WEEKDAY 0.319 0.466 0 1
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY 0.249 0.180 0 0.712
THEIL 1.020 0.095 0.662 1.097
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fans have a preference for a contest in which the quality of talent is evenly
distributed across the teams (Buraimo 2008; Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo
2005), then this variable is in itself a measure of outcome uncertainty. As such,
we need to recognise the possibility of multicollinearity with OUTCOME
UNCERTAINTY. Hence, ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE is
included in the Heckman selection model, since it represents a prior indicator
of outcome uncertainty before the season starts when the broadcasters begin to
select games.
We use the sum of the two teams’ current points per game up to the match
to derive combined points per game. In English football, three points are
awarded for a victory, one point for a draw, and no points for a loss. The
measure captures the form of the teams prior to the contest. The combined
value captures the overall form of the two teams, and higher values are likely
to have a positive impact on audience ratings. The next set of independent
variables captures the extent to which at least one of the teams in the contest is
in contention for the championship (winning the league), European
competition the following season, or relegation. Contention is computed using
an algorithm proposed by Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004). A team is in
contention if it wins all its remaining games (three points per game) and
others only tie theirs (one point per game), and in doing so, the team is able to
win the title or qualify for Europe. A team is also in contention for relegation
if other teams win their remaining matches and it only ties and in doing so
will be relegated. These in contention variables (CHAMPION CONTENTION,
EUROPE CONTENTION, and RELEGATION CONTENTION) capture the long-
run aspect of competitiveness and are expected to have a positive impact on
television audience, ceteris paribus. Previous studies have constructed numerous
variables to capture contention (see, e.g., Jennett 1984; Pawlowski and Anders
2012). However, they have all used the number of points necessary to win the
championship in their measures. The number of points required to win the
championship is available ex post, and such information is not available to
consumers. It is for this reason that Goddard and Asimakopoulos’s approach
is preferred.
Games televised by Setanta in the 2007–08 season feature in the data, and a
dummy variable, SETANTA, takes the value of 1 if the game was broadcast by
the new entrant. Otherwise, SETANTA take the value of 0, as the game was
broadcast by BSkyB. Given Setanta’s limited penetration within the televised
football market, the coefficient of SETANTA is expected to be negative with a
large magnitude.
Games are televised at different times of the day and week to avoid clashes
and cannibalising audience ratings for other games. However, all games on the
last day of the season are played at the same time. A dummy variable, OTHER
MATCHES, is included and takes the value of 0 if no other matches are
occurring at the same time and 1 if at least one other match is taking place
concurrently. Another dummy variable, DERBY, is included to capture
matches that involve local and historical rivals. DERBY may or may not be
significant in the context of television audiences. In models of gate attendance,
DERBY has proved to be a significant determinant of demand, such is the
intense historical and local rivalry between neighbouring football teams
(Buraimo 2008; Buraimo, Paramio, and Campos 2010; Forrest and Simmons
2006). However, television audiences are drawn from a wider population, and
10 B. Buraimo and R. Simmons
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such rivalry may be regarded as a local matter. Forrest, Simmons, and
Buraimo (2005) found that derby matches had no significant effect on
television audiences. Alternatively, national audiences may similarly share this
passion for rivalry.
The final control variable in Xijtis the dummy variable WEEKDAY. This
takes the value of 0 if the match is televised on Saturday or Sunday and 1
otherwise. This is intended to capture the reduced leisure time available
during the week relative to the abundance of leisure time available at the
weekend. As well as these variables, a set of fixed effects is included in Z,
comprising team, month, and season effects.
Our focus variable is outcome uncertainty, defined here as the absolute
difference in the two teams’ probability of winning the match. The
probabilities are derived from the betting odds posted by William Hill, a
leading UK bookmaker. The choice of bookmarker is irrelevant, as the
correlations between posted odds by different bookmakers are extremely high
(around 0.95) and the results are robust to the use of different bookmakers’
odds. The use of odds to compute probabilities is apt, as they are very strong
predictors of match outcomes, indicating a strong degree of efficiency. A
further advantage of using betting odds is that they capture all relevant public
as well as private information that is not readily observed but which may
affect performance, such as player injuries, suspension, and dressing-room
morale.
The sum of unadjusted (home win, away win, and draw) probabilities
routinely exceeds unity due to the bookmaker’s margin. This margin, or ‘over-
round’, was around 12% over our sample period. The adjusted probabilities
are derived by dividing each of the probabilities by the sum of unadjusted
probabilities. By doing so, the adjusted values sum to 1. The values of
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY, the absolute difference in home and away team
probabilities, for televised games range from 0 to 0.712. A value of 0 represents
matches with the highest degree of uncertainty, while high values represent
those matches with a low degree of uncertainty. The values of uncertainty of
outcome show that there is a high variation, given that the theoretical range is
between 0 and 1. Hence, there is enough variation to capture any effect of
uncertainty of outcome on audience rating. A shortcoming of this measure is
that the draw probability is assumed constant. This is a reasonable
assumption, since there is only a slight variation in the draw probabilities
across matches. However, as a robustness check and to deal explicitly with the
draw probability, an alternative measure of outcome uncertainty, the Theil
measure, is also used (Buraimo and Simmons 2008; Czarnitzki and Stadtmann
2002; Peel and Thomas 1992). The Theil measure makes use of the probabilities
of all three match outcomes and is derived as:
X3
i¼1
Pi  ln 1
pi
 
where Pi is the probability of outcome i, which is any one of the three possible
results. It is highly likely that the results, qualitatively, would be similar, as the
correlation coefficient between OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY and the Theil
measure is –0.944.
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Considering the variables in Yijt, selecting games for broadcast is not
straightforward. The challenge that broadcasters face in this market is that
games selected for broadcast cannot be televised at the regular time of 3:00 pm
on Saturday, by League rule. Instead, games must be moved to other times of
the day (usually noon or 5:30 pm) or other days of the week. The rationale for
such a move is to reduce the substitution effect that will occur across the
whole of English football, since the majority of football games (in the English
Premier League and the three professional divisions of the Football League)
take place at 3:00 pm on Saturdays. Many spectators will simply substitute
going to these games with watching live transmission of Premier League
games. Moving games from 3:00 pm is disruptive, particularly to season-ticket
holders who purchase their tickets in advance of the season starting. To
minimise this disruption, a schedule of games for the first half of the season
(normally from August to December) is announced prior to the start of the
season. This means that the broadcasters have to choose which games to
televise without any information on how well the teams will be doing. It is
therefore likely that the broadcaster will instead make use of other exogenous
information outside the current season.
Similar to audiences, broadcasters are likely to be attracted to games
involving teams with a high wage bill, a proxy measure for talent. COMBINED
RELATIVE WAGE is likely to have a positive impact on the decision to televise
a match. The ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE is also included
to capture the emphasis that the broadcaster might place on teams who are
evenly matched. With respect to talent, broadcasters may have a preference for
a contest in which the quality of talent is evenly distributed across the teams
(Buraimo 2008; Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo 2005). The inclusion of
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE in the selection part of the
model represents a prior indicator of outcome uncertainty before the season
starts when the broadcasters begin to select games. To capture the effects of
the broadcasters’ decision-making process in the first and second half of the
season, COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE and ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN
RELATIVE WAGE are interacted with FIRST HALF and SECOND HALF. FIRST
HALF takes the value of value 1 for the months between August and
December and 0 otherwise, and SECOND HALF takes the value of 1 during
the months January to May and 0 otherwise. By interacting the RELATIVE
WAGE variables with FIRST HALF and SECOND HALF, the relative weights
attributed to RELATIVE WAGE during the first and second parts of the season
by the broadcasters can be evaluated.
Selection for broadcasting is also likely to be based on how popular the
teams are. In order to capture the popularity of a given match, the (log of) the
combined mean attendance of the two teams from the previous season, ln
(COMBINED LAG ATTENDANCE), is interacted with FIRST HALF to capture
the fact the broadcasters have to select matches for the broadcast schedule for
the first part of the season in advance of the season starting. It is only in the
second half that they are able to use contemporary information to inform their
selection. In the absence of any information on form, the points at the end of
the previous season are used as an indicator of future form, at least for the
first half of the season. Therefore, the combined and the absolute difference in
lag points per game, interacted with the dummy variable FIRST HALF, are
included. During the second half of the season, however, the broadcasters, like
12 B. Buraimo and R. Simmons
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the television audiences, are able to base their selection decision on
contemporary information. It is with this in mind that COMBINED POINTS
PER GAME × SECOND HALF is included. This is the sum of the points per
game of the two teams prior to the current match during the second half of the
season; SECOND HALF is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the
second half of the season (January to May inclusive) and 0 otherwise.
As with the television audience demand equation, champion contention,
Europe contention, and relegation contention are included, but only for the
second half of the season, since such information is not available to the
broadcasters during the first half of the season. Each of the contention
variables are therefore interacted with SECOND HALF. The intention of the
variables is to capture any preferences the broadcasters have for games
involving teams in contention of any end-of-season honours over and above
any uncertainty of outcome. The potential impact of DERBY is also modelled,
as this may influence the broadcasters’ selection. The final covariate is
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY. For reasons noted earlier, this is interacted with
SECOND HALF. Furthermore, as well as using the absolute difference in home
and away win probabilities, the Theil measure is also used for robustness.
Definitions of the variables along with their summary statistics for the
televised sample are presented in Tables 4a and 4b.
5. Empirical Results
The results of the Heckman selection model with robust standard errors
clustered by rounds5 are presented in Table 5. In the selection part of the
model, the coefficients of COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE × FIRST HALF and
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE × SECOND HALF are positive, as was to be
expected. However, it is revealing that the coefficient of COMBINED
RELATIVE WAGE × FIRST HALF is greater than that of COMBINED
RELATIVE WAGE × SECOND HALF. In the absence of contemporary
information to select games on a round-by-round basis, the wage bills strongly
influence the broadcasters’ choice. However, once there is greater freedom of
the selection, the impact of wage bill falls, although it is still highly significant.
This pattern is repeated for ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE, as
the magnitude of the variable is greater in the second half of the season.
Taking the relative wage-bill variables together, the broadcasters’ selection is
influenced by the total talent and also by how evenly the talent is distributed
across the two teams.
The coefficient of DERBY is significantly different from 0, and broadcasters
favour games with historical and local rivalry attached. The popularity of the
game as measured by ln(COMBINED LAG ATTENDANCE) × FIRST HALF is
also significant, indicating that games involving teams with a strong following
are more likely to be selected for broadcasting in the absence of current
information on form. Similarly, games involving teams with high performances
from the previous season influence selection in the first part of the season. It
would also seem that if the previous season’s performances of the two teams
are comparable, this also increases the likelihood of selection given the sign
and magnitude of the coefficient of ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN LAG POINTS
PER GAME × FIRST HALF. The variable COMBINED POINTS PER
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GAME × SECOND HALF has a significant coefficient, and broadcasters value
games involving high-performing teams. However, such games need not
involve teams with comparable performance given the insignificant coefficient
of ABSOLUTE DIFFENCE IN POINTS PER GAME × SECOND HALF. Of the
contention variables, only EUROPE CONTENTION × SECOND HALF has a
significant coefficient, indicating that as far as end-of-season honours are
concerned, the race for qualifying for European competition strongly
influences broadcaster selection of games.
As for the focus variable OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY, its estimated impact
on selection is not significantly different from 0. This is a different result to
that shown by Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005). The evidence suggests
Table 5. Heckman selection model for TV audience ratings
Audience Model: Dependent Variable is ln AUDIENCEijt
 
Coefficient t-Statistic
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE 0.119** (2.12)
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE −0.019 (0.51)
COMBINED POINTS PER GAME 0.023 (1.25)
CHAMPION CONTENTION 0.014 (0.37)
EUROPE CONTENTION −0.031 (0.64)
RELEGATION CONTENTION −0.019 (0.47)
SETANTA −0.966*** (22.94)
OTHER MATCHES −0.106 (0.76)
DERBY −0.008 (0.19)
WEEKDAY −0.083*** (3.85)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY −0.039 (0.49)
CONSTANT 13.037*** (32.44)
Selection model: Dependent variable is Prob TELEVISEDijt
 
Coefficient t-Statistic
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE × FIRST HALF 0.572*** (7.93)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE × SECOND HALF 0.275*** (2.84)
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE × FIRST HALF −0.526*** (5.87)
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE × SECOND HALF −0.387*** (3.10)
DERBY 0.463*** (3.58)
LN(COMBINED LAG ATTENDANCE) × FIRST HALF 0.140*** (4.42)
COMBINED LAG POINTS PER GAME × FIRST HALF 0.005*** (3.27)
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN LAG POINTS PER GAME × FIRST HALF −0.011*** (3.87)
COMBINED POINTS PER GAME × SECOND HALF 0.782*** (6.81)
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN POINTS PER GAME × SECOND HALF 0.175 (0.99)
CHAMPION CONTENTION × SECOND HALF 0.141 (1.28)
EUROPE CONTENTION × SECOND HALF 0.272*** (3.09)
RELEGATION CONTENTION × SECOND HALF −0.006 (0.06)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY × SECOND HALF 0.059 (0.19)
CONSTANT −3.647*** (13.65)
Lambda 0.007 0.083
Rho 0.026
Observations 2872
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Clustered by round of match using robust standard errors.
*p < 0.10
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01. Month, season, and team effects are significant.
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that broadcasters’ selection is no longer driven by uncertainty of outcome and
other factors are more important in the selection choice.
For the second part of the Heckman model, audience, the only variables
which have statistically significant coefficients are COMBINED RELATIVE
WAGE, WEEKDAY, and SETANTA. The relevance of SETANTA in this context
is to suggest that the platform on which the game is transmitted matters. This
is not surprising given that different platforms have different levels of
penetration in the football broadcast market. As for WEEKDAY, the significant
coefficient signals that, due to relative lack of leisure time during the week,
games televised from Monday to Friday inclusive have lower audiences
compared with those televised at the weekend, a marginal negative effect of
8.3%. Therefore, controlling for broadcast market conditions and team
idiosyncrasies, COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE is all that matters to television
audiences. Unlike the broadcasters who care how the talent is distributed
across the two teams, television audiences are indifferent to this, and all that
matters is that the volume of talent on display is high, whichever team has
that talent. The fixed effects for months, seasons, and teams are included, and
each set is significant. Hence, the impacts of talent noted are over and above
the effects of specific teams which in themselves influence the size of television
audiences that tune in.
The use of the Heckman sample selection correction reveals that the
correlation between the error terms from the selection and demand equations
is not significantly different from 0. This indicates that there are no discerning
features between those matches that are broadcast and those that are not. The
effect of this result is that the estimates from the demand equation are not
significantly different from those that would otherwise be derived from OLS,
that is, there is no selection bias.
As well as using a Heckman selection model, OLS is used to model TV
audiences. The results of the OLS estimates are shown in Table 6. We test for
the normality of the residuals in each of the models noted in Table 6. The tests
show that the hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed with a 0
mean cannot be rejected. In model 1 of Table 6, and also the Heckman model,
the variables with significant coefficients are COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE,
WEEKDAY, and SETANTA. Irrespective of model specification, the OUTCOME
UNCERTAINTY variable has a coefficient that is not significantly different
from 0. The significance of the COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE coefficient
indicates that audience size is influenced by the total quality of players across
the two teams; the higher the COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE, the greater the
audience rating. The magnitude of the effect is such that if the quality of
players as represented by relative wage bill were to improve by one standard
deviation, the audience size is estimated to increase by 11.1%, an increase of
approximately 108,389 viewers per match on BSkyB’s platform. Given that
deviations in recent season have increased, if the standard deviation of
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE for televised games in the most recent season
(0.924) were to be used, the increase in television audience is 113,938 viewers
per match. These increases are non-trivial given that this is a subscription
platform. It is therefore in the broadcasters’ interest to televise those games in
which the available talent on show is high.
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RELATIVE WAGE and ABSOLUTE
DIFFERENCE IN POINTS PER GAME had insignificant coefficients and were
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Table 6. OLS models of TV audience ratings7
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient
t-
Statistic Coefficient
t-
Statistic Coefficient
t-
Statistic
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE 0.126** (2.84) 0.111** (2.38)
COMBINED POINTS PER GAME 0.021 (1.11) 0.022 (1.19) 0.015 (0.79)
OTHER MATCHES −0.104 (0.70) −0.100 (0.78) −0.105 (0.81)
DERBY −0.010 (0.039) −0.016 (0.42) −0.022 (0.58)
WEEKDAY −0.086*** (3.79) −0.085*** (3.78) −0.092*** (4.11)
CHAMPION CONTENTION 0.012 (0.33) 0.014 (0.39) 0.008 (0.23)
EUROPE CONTENTION −0.035 (0.68) −0.029 (0.58) −0.036 (0.71)
RELEGATION CONTENTION −0.022 (0.54) −0.019 (0.47) −0.022 (0.55)
SETANTA −0.967*** (21.80) −0.982*** (20.70) −0.971*** (20.41)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTYa −0.054 (0.76)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2000–2001
−0.604* (1.82) −0.584* (1.84)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2001–2002
−0.691* (1.83) −0.632* (1.65)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2002–2003
−0.096 (0.54) −0.067 (0.37)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2003–2004
0.176 (0.82) 0.211 (1.07)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2004–2005
−0.106 (0.77) −0.156 (1.07)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2005–2006
0.1113 (0.96) 0.099 (0.83)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2006–2007
−0.065 (0.22) −0.124 (0.45)
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY ×
2007–2008
0.077 (0.59) 0.033 (0.24)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2000–2001
−0.042 (0.58)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2001–2002
−0.028 (0.37)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2002–2003
−0.019 (0.25)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2003–2004
−0.013 (0.23)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2004–2005
0.105* (1.76)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2005–2006
0.125** (2.23)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2006–2007
0.110** (2.02)
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE ×
2007–2008
0.110** (2.33)
CONSTANT 13.791*** (75.60) 14.216*** (51.56) 14.399*** (53.32)
Adjusted R2 0.698 0.703 0.711
Observations 631 631 631
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Clustered by round of match using robust standard errors.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01. Month, season, and team effects are significant.
a
As an alternative, the Theil measure of outcome uncertainty is also used. The results are
qualitatively similar. However, as the absolute difference in home team and away team
probabilities is more intuitive, we therefore chose to report this measure instead.
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duly dropped from the regression. Their exclusion can be justified on the
grounds of collinearity with OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY. The effect of
COMBINED POINTS PER GAME is not significantly different from 0.
Television audiences are influenced more so by the identity of the teams and
not their respective performances to date. The dummy variables OTHER
MATCHES and DERBY and the CONTENTION variables do not have
significant impacts on the size of television audiences. The dummy variable
OTHER MATCHES is intended to capture the greater proportion of games
televised on the last day of the season, but the lack of significance would
suggest that such games are not substitutes for one another. This raises the
interesting prospect that it might be possible for broadcasters to televise games
concurrently without harming total audience ratings. This is particularly
relevant, as the number of live games from one contract period to the next has
increased, but as the number of games increases, it might be necessary to
televise some matches concurrently. For DERBY matches, it would seem that
the attraction of such games is limited, ceteris paribus, to stadium goers and not
television viewers.
Audience ratings for matches televised during the week are lower
compared with those televised at the weekend; the fall in audience rating is of
the magnitude of 8.6%. This is likely to be capturing the limited amount of
leisure time available to audiences during the week compared with the
weekend. Also, those games televised by Setanta attracted far fewer audiences
compared to those televised on BSkyB’s channels. During the period of
analysis, Setanta’s penetration within UK households was much smaller
compared with BSkyB’s.
The coefficient of the focus variable OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY is not
significantly different from 0, and this result is robust to a series of modelling
approaches.6 This finding is contrary to those reported in earlier papers
(Buraimo and Simmons 2009; Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo 2005) and could
be capturing an evolution in television audiences’ preferences. We interact the
focus variable with season dummy variables. The estimates are reported in
model 2 of Table 6. The coefficients of OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY interacted
with 2000–2001 and 2001–2002 are significantly different from 0 (at the 10%
level) with the appropriate signs showing, tentatively, that television audiences
value contests that are close. However, in the seasons after 2002, the
coefficients of OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY interacted with each season from
2003–2003 to 2007–2008 are not significantly different from 0. This would seem
to mark a transition away from valuing uncertainty of outcome. To explore
television audience demand further, COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE is also
interacted with seasons, and the results are shown in model 3 of Table 6.
Strikingly, the interaction of COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE with the earliest
four seasons is not significantly different from 0. However, for the seasons
2004–05 to 2007–08 inclusive, COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE interacted with
season has significant coefficients. Again, it should be noted that these impacts
are over and above the team fixed effects which already distinguish between
the identity and brand of the teams. For example, the reported effect of
COMBINED RELATIVE WAGE is in addition to the effects of individual teams
which would attract large audiences anyway.
This is a major result that policymakers and league authorities should not
ignore. The central finding of this paper suggests that consumer interest has
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shifted away from uncertainty of outcome to the quality of playing talent.
Television audiences are drawn to games with a greater presence of star talent
on show. Preferences for balanced contests and the anticipation of an uncertain
outcome appear to have waned amongst television audiences. Instead, decision
makers and league authorities should concern themselves with one dominant
strategy: maximising the quality of talent coming into the league. For this to
happen, clubs will need to continue to spend large sums of money on
recruiting talent. Assessment of efforts to control such costs at the levels of
league and governing body are beyond the scope of this paper (see, e.g.,
Franck [2014] and Peeters and Szymanski [2014] on UEFA’s Financial Fair Play
policy), but such efforts need to be reconciled with the preferences of viewers
as expressed through audience demand.
Acquisition of star players to satisfy viewer preferences implies a net
migration of talent into the league. However, such migration must be at the
expense of other leagues. The league and its clubs therefore have an incentive
to attract the best players to the league. They must be able to meet the cost of
such extravagance, and one major source of finance is the revenues from the
television broadcast sector. In the case of the English Premier League, it is
imperative that it maximises the revenue that it generates from the broadcast
market. Consequently, its rights strategy must give considerable attention to
how to make use of the growing competition amongst broadcasters,
particularly if it is to attract talent which in turn will maximise audience
demand.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the notion that uncertainty of outcome matters to football
audiences and, more specifically, television audiences for the English Premier
League. The concept of uncertainty of outcome is a central conjecture in the
economics literature on professional team sports, and since it was first
presented, its relevance to policymaking and management practices in
professional sports leagues has been strong. The empirical testing ground for
uncertainty of outcome has usually been stadium attendees. Traditionally,
income from stadia has been the dominant source of revenue. However, in
today’s sports markets in which the supply of talent to sports leagues is global,
attention should shift to television audiences for sport. The use of television
audiences over stadium attendees to test the uncertainty of outcome
hypothesis is more appropriate.
We find that uncertainty of outcome does not have a significant impact on
television audience ratings overall. Separating the measure of uncertainty of
outcome by seasons shows significant coefficients over the first two seasons of
our sample, albeit at the 10% level. But over seasons, this significance
disappears. The dissipation of the uncertainty of outcome effect coincides with
an increase in the quality of talent employed in the English Premier League.
We argue that there has been a transition of preference for uncertainty of
outcome towards a preference for increased talent. The classic notion of a pure
sporting contest in which the outcome is unpredictable has been replaced with
one in which the preference is for sporting entertainment delivered by
superstars. The unpredictability of the outcome no longer matters for television
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viewers. The implications of these findings are that leagues should no longer
defend their practices on the ground of uncertainty of outcome, and
consequently the defence of sports policies should be reconsidered.
Furthermore, if consumer welfare is to be maximised, maximising uncertainty
of outcome is unlikely to achieve this. Instead, policies and strategies aimed at
the labour market and how it operates should be the focus of league
administrators. The policy recommendation that emerges from this analysis is
that the league (and its constituent clubs) needs to increase the quality of
talent migrating into the league; the distribution of such talent across the clubs
is presently of little significance. Attempts to increase the quality of talent
coming into the league mean direct competition against other leagues
competing for the same talent. The league should create the right incentives
for clubs to attract the best players, and similarly clubs need to create the right
economic incentives to attract players from other leagues. This in turn will
maximise television audience ratings.
Notes
1. Interestingly, in the German Bundesliga, there is a single broadcaster (Sky), and all games are
televised. This suggests some variation in policies towards football broadcasting across the EU.
2. Whilst minute-by-minute data would be more insightful in measuring television audience
demand, such data are not readily available. As noted above, only one study (Alavy, Alison
Gaskell, and Szymanski 2010) has made use of minute-by-minute measures of audience ratings.
3. The mean gate attendance over this period was 34,474 per match (from Sky Sports Football
Yearbook).
4. In the 2000–01 season, the correlation coefficient between performance and wages was 0.675. By
the 2007–08 season, this had risen to 0.814. The mean correlation coefficient across the eight
seasons is 0.795. In recent seasons, this figure has reached 0.888.
5. The standard errors are clustered by the rounds of matches, as the choice of matches to be
televised is constrained by the fixture list. For a given set of matches in a given round, the
broadcasters must select a proportion of matches for that given weekend. This is a significant
constraint, as the broadcasters cannot select the best n matches from 380 games. In this sense,
the round of the fixture list is binding, and a proportion of games from those available that
weekend must be chosen. This is the condition for which the models are clustered. The standard
errors of the models are therefore adjusted to reflect this.
6. We also use instrumental variable regression in which we treat OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY as
endogenous. In doing so, the variables Absolute difference in relative wage and Absolute difference in
points per game are used as instruments. The results were similar to those generated using OLS.
7. The Ramsey reset test is used to test the functional form of the models. The results of the test
indicate that the models are correctly specified. Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the
models have no omitted variables cannot be rejected. With respect to multicollinearity, variance
inflation factor is used. The results indicate that multicollinearity does not affect the coefficients.
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